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David Clough’s two-volume work On Animals claims to be the first systematic 
Christian theological exploration of the place of nonhuman animals within creation 
which also provides an ethical reflection on what that might mean for our relationship 
with nonhuman animals in contemporary (Western) society. It follows in the footsteps 
of Andrew Linzey’s works such as Animal Theology and Animals on the Agenda.1 It 
is perhaps surprising, given that Clough’s theological approach is based, like 
Linzey’s, on a strong emphasis on both fall and eschaton, that Clough does not 
interact more with this earlier work. 
Volume 1, Systematic Theology, is dedicated to doctrinal discussion and concludes 
that nonhuman animals are divinely valued members of the created order and, as 
such, will share in the new creation. 
Volume 2, Theological Ethics, sees Clough developing a Christian nonhuman animal 
ethic from his doctrinal conclusions. He suggests a variety of practical solutions 
covering a wide array of areas of contemporary life where human activity impacts the 
lives of nonhuman animals. 
In this extended review, we shall provide a summary of the cumulative arguments 
across both volumes of On Animals before offering our reflections. 
Clough seeks to provide a reappraisal of what he calls ‘ill-considered renditions of 
the distinction between human beings and other animals that are implausible, 
unbiblical, theologically problematic and ethically misleading.’ (Vol 1, xii) 
 
1 Andrew Linzey, Animal Theology (London: SCM Press, 1994); Andrew Linzey and 
Dorothy Yamamoto (eds), Animals on the Agenda: questions about animals for 
theology and ethics (London: SCM Press, 1998). 
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He begins with a discussion of the doctrine of creation, concluding (with 
Pannenberg) that humans should not be placed at the centre of creation, nor should 
they be considered the purpose of creation. Thus, Clough rejects any and all 
attempts to justify an inherent human superiority on the basis of the notion that 
humans were the last things to be created in the Genesis creation narrative (Vol 1, 3, 
8-9, 15n43). He invokes the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo as a means of retaining the 
distinction between God and creation (Vol 1, 26). 
This God/creation-including-humans hierarchy is assisted by both Christian theology 
and evolutionary science. The Christian idea of creaturely continuity dates back at 
least to Basil of Caesarea (Vol 1, 27). Scientifically, the human genome project and 
research into the cognitive capacities of nonhuman animals challenge the dominant 
historical view of human-nonhuman discontinuity (Vol 1, 29-30). 
This theological continuity between humans and nonhuman animals includes 
redemption and, more specifically, the redemption made possible by the Christ-
event. Clough argues that Jesus’ being human should not entail human exclusivity in 
the salvation made possible by the Christ-event, particularly given that the word used 
in John’s Gospel to describe the Incarnation is flesh, which, biblically, is a quality 
possessed by all creatures (Vol 1, 83-85). Clough further holds that such nonhuman 
redemption is necessary and argues for the possibility of nonhuman animals 
committing sin, which he supports with references to the Hebrew Bible, for example: 
the culpability of nonhuman animals in acts of sexual misconduct (Leviticus 15:15) 
and the necessity of the nonhumans of Nineveh to repent alongside the humans 
(Jonah 3:7-10) (Vol 1, 109). 
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Nonhuman animals are, for Clough, in need of atonement as much as humans. This 
is because, whether nonhuman animals sin or not, they are still affected by the 
consequences of sin (Vol 1, 120). Clough therefore argues that the scope of 
redemption extends to nonhuman animals: ‘the hope that the whole of creation will 
be restored, liberated and redeemed is present in the Old and New Testaments and 
in patristic teaching, as well as being represented in more recent theological 
discussions’ (Vol 1, 152). Clough ends Volume 1 by describing the nonhuman-
inclusive eschaton. Predators and prey can coexist in the eschaton, says Clough, 
because predators no longer need to hunt and to kill prey animals to ensure their 
own survival, and so they no longer would do such a thing. 
We applaud Clough’s effort not merely to investigate this area of exploration but to 
integrate it into systematic theology rather than leaving it as a specialist sub-sub-
discipline (as has perhaps been the fate of Linzey’s work). 
Volume 2 on theological ethics is a more extensive and stronger book, perhaps a 
sign of the author growing into his theme. Here Clough takes up the doctrinal 
conclusions of Volume 1 to address several major issues in the contemporary 
(Western) world. In a clear methodology, Clough systematically evaluates those 
spheres of twenty-first century (Western) human life where human behaviour 
towards and treatment of nonhuman animals is unacceptable, considering these 
doctrinal conclusions. Each chapter then concludes with ethical suggestions for 
improving these interspecies relationships, though Clough emphasises the 
speculative nature of this attempt and admits the possible controversy of his 
conclusions (Vol 2, 32). 
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Previous philosophical and ethical considerations of nonhuman animals – such as 
those of Aquinas, Kant, Hume, Rawls, Singer, Regan, Hursthouse, Donovan and 
Adams, and Nussbaum – have been either ‘theologically inadequate’ or only useful 
in part (Vol 2, 3-15). An adequate nonhuman animal ethic, for Clough, is one which 
1) facilitates the flourishing of individual nonhuman animals (Vol 2, 22); 2) avoids 
blocking the flourishing of individual nonhuman animals (Vol 2, 23-24); and 3) sees 
nonhuman animals as humans’ neighbours with all the moral responsibility that 
entails (Vol 2, 26-29). 
The first six out of seven spheres of twenty-first century Western life which Clough 
discusses involve humans’ use of domestic nonhuman animals.  The first sphere is 
food production, with emphasis on the meat and dairy industries and their practices 
(Vol 2, 35). He discusses both how these industries affect the nonhuman animals 
used for food themselves (Vol 2, 35-54) and how current farming practices affect 
humans, wild nonhuman animals, and the environment (Vol 2, 54-59). 
The second sphere is the textile and clothing industries, with a focus on the 
production of silk and its impact on silk moths (Vol 2, 104). 
The third sphere is that of working nonhuman animals, which Clough deems a 
unique phenomenon due to the incentive for humans to care for nonhuman animals 
under their employ; additionally, there is no need to kill working nonhuman animals 
(Vol 2, 108). Clough focuses on police dogs and argues that while there may seem 
to be legitimate ethical concerns in raising and training non-consenting nonhuman 
animals to be placed into dangerous situations, the criteria on which police dogs are 
selected for service are not so different from the criteria by which human recruits are 
judged. Thus, only those best suited to police work are entered into police service, 
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and that includes willingness and enthusiasm for the work itself (Vol 2, 128-129). The 
situation is, however, quite different for nonhuman animals employed in draught 
labour (Vol 2, 120). 
The fourth sphere is the use of nonhuman animals in experimentation and research, 
which has historically (and uniquely) received much Christian criticism. The chief 
sins of this industry lie in insufficient and poorly enforced regulation, as well as the 
inconsistency in our arguments for nonhuman animal testing and experimentation 
(Vol 2, 131-134, 152-153). (So, for example, Clough points out that animal testing 
would have failed to predict correctly the efficacy of some important drugs.) 
The fifth sphere is the use of nonhuman animals in sport and entertainment. Clough 
argues that it is never excusable to make use of a nonhuman animal in sport or 
entertainment where that nonhuman animal’s inclusion is detrimental to their 
flourishing because ‘our goals in making use of other animals in these areas are 
essentially frivolous’ (Vol 2, 161). This remains the case when the individual 
nonhuman animals appear, at first, to be well looked after, such as racing horses 
(Vol 2, 163-173). 
The sixth sphere is that of companion animals – a phrase which Clough prefers to 
‘pet’ though he admits it is not perfect (Vol 2, 182). Clough identifies four issues with 
the pet industry which require attention: 1) even if a human believes they are treating 
their nonhuman animal companion well, they have no guarantee the nonhuman 
animal in question is flourishing (Vol 2, 183); 2) despite the positive character of 
nonhuman animal shelters, the misleading language of euthanising nonhuman 
animals who cannot be rehomed or accommodated should be replaced with 
language of killing; 3) the pedigree industry oversaturates the pet market, which 
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means more nonhuman animals are taken to shelters (or abandoned) when they 
cannot be homed, which puts them at a greater risk of being killed (Vol 2, 208); 4) 
the pet industry has a negative impact on wild populations, such as has been seen 
with the dramatic decrease in wild terrapin populations due to their being 
appropriated by the pet industry (Vol 2, 199-200). 
The final sphere which Clough discusses is the (negative) human impact on wild 
nonhuman animal populations (Vol 2, 216). He specifically references poaching (Vol 
2, 218), and laments the necessity of the language of the Anthropocene as well as 
the evidence which suggests we are currently living in a sixth mass extinction that is 
(almost entirely) the fault of the species Homo sapiens (Vol 2, 221). 
Considering the current state of these spheres, Clough offers the following ethical 
conclusions (summarised in Vol 2, 239-242): 
1. Christians should stop participating in industries which make use of intensive 
farming, and they have ‘strong faith-based reasons to adopt a vegan diet’ (Vol 2, 
239). 
2. Christians should clothe themselves using materials which do not contain 
nonhuman animal products 
3. We must develop a series of norms of what it means to give nonhuman labourers 
fair working conditions and treatment 
4. We must seek to bring to an end our use of nonhuman animals as research 
subjects when this burdens those animals and ‘is incompatible with their 
flourishing as creatures of God’ (Vol 2, 159) 
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5. Nonhuman animals should never be subjected to suffering and death for the sake 
of sport or entertainment 
6. ‘the pedigree breeding of animals should be stopped, pets and companion 
animals should be sourced from shelters, and attention given to ensuring they are 
kept in spacious and enriched environments where they can flourish’ (Vol 2, 241) 
7. Captive wild animals should be kept in appropriate environments and 
conservation efforts should continue, and conflict between wild nonhuman 
animals and humans should be reduced 
8. We must take care vis-à-vis the causes of contemporary mass extinction, which 
can be done through a switch to veganism 
We will begin our evaluation of these two books with a discussion of those areas of 
Clough’s argument with which we most uncritically agree. Those are: his preference 
for subjective over objective immortality and his doctrine of Incarnation. We will then 
discuss those areas where we feel Clough’s argument falls short. 
Clough argues that all creatures must retain individual eschatological immortality. 
While he does not use this language specifically, Clough is here arguing for universal 
subjective immortality. Subjective immortality is as opposed to objective immortality, 
the latter a term first coined by Alfred North Whitehead to mean preservation of lives 
only in the memory of God. 
Historically, Christian theology has afforded humans subjective immortality and 
nonhuman animals either no immortality at all or, at best, objective immortality. If we 
are to argue that God has the same relationship to nonhuman animals during their 
earthly lives as God does to humans during their earthly lives, then it would be 
inconsistent to say that God has a different relationship to nonhuman animals in the 
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eschaton than God does to humans in the eschaton. Thus, we have two options: 1) 
all creatures, human or no, have subjective immortality in the eschaton, or 2) no 
creatures do. Clough takes option 1), which we feel better reflects the Christian belief 
in an omnibenevolent God who would send God’s Son to redeem creation. 
The second area of Clough’s argument with which we mostly confidently agree is 
that of his doctrine of Incarnation. The reality of Jesus’ humanity has, historically, 
been used to justify the human-specificity of the Christ-event. Clough rejects this, 
pointing out that John’s use of the word flesh indicates Jesus is incarnate in a 
physicality which is shared by all creatures, and hence the Christ-event is universal 
to all creatures. Clough holds that the familiar maxim offered in Galatians 3:28 can 
include that there is no human or nonhuman in Christ. 
This argument is helpful for two reasons. First, it satisfactorily addresses the 
meaning behind the inclusion of the word flesh (rather than the word human) in 
John’s prologue. Second, it supports the cosmic nature of the Incarnation and 
redemption made possible by the Christ-event, which is consistent with other parts of 
the New Testament.2 
In his review of Volume 1, James R A Merrick critiques Clough’s doctrine of 
Incarnation. He argues that understanding the Incarnation as flesh ignores 
‘tradition’s debates about the composition of Christ’s humanity as well as the 
perceived soteriological significance of such’. He further holds that Clough 
contradicts himself in saying that humanity is not a microcosm of creation but that 
 
2 John G Gibbs and John C Gibbs provide a helpful study of the cosmic scope of 
redemption in Pauline theology: Gibbs and Gibbs, ‘The Cosmic Scope of 
Redemption According to Paul’, Biblica 56.1 (1975), pp. 25-9. 
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Jesus’ humanity is sufficient to represent all of creation.3 We would disagree 
particularly with this second point on the ground that it is not humanity which is a 
microcosm of creation but flesh. 
Robert John Russell holds that our view of the Incarnation must consider both the 
physics and biology of Jesus’ physicality. Athanasius famously argued that ‘only that 
which is assumed by Christ can be redeemed by Christ’. Thus, Russell argues, 
Jesus’ Incarnation as a physical creature necessitates that all aspects of Jesus’ 
physical existence are part of the Incarnation and all that it entails. Jesus’ Incarnation 
as a physical creature includes the entirety of the biological and physical laws of the 
universe, so the entirety of the biological and physical laws of the universe are part 
of the Incarnation and all that it entails.4 This, we argue, answers Merrick’s challenge 
regarding the microcosm contradiction, as the use of the word flesh can refer to both 
the biology and physics of Jesus’ physical existence. Thus, flesh is not only a 
biological trait, but a physical one as well, and one which is shared by all living 
creatures (and possibly extends further). This includes the ‘boundary cases’ which 
Clough identifies as problematic but does not discuss in detail (Vol 1, xvi). To be a 
physical human – and to be flesh – is to rely on the physical laws by which 
everything is governed. In this sense, Jesus’ flesh can be truly universal. It is 
disappointing however that Clough does not even acknowledge Niels Gregersen’s 
pioneering work on deep incarnation, stemming back to his Dialog paper of 2001.5 
 
3 James R A Merrick, ‘Review of On Animals Volume 1: Systematic Theology by 
David L Clough’, Anglican Theological Review 95.2 (2013), pp. 364-5. 
4 Robert John Russell, ‘Jesus: The Way of all Flesh and the Proleptic Feather of 
Time’, in Niels Henrik Gregersen (ed.), Incarnation: On the Scope and Depth of 
Christology (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress, 2015), p. 340. 
5 Niels Gregersen, ‘The Cross of Christ in an Evolutionary World’, Dialog: A Journal 
of Theology, 40.3 (2001), pp. 192-207. 
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We now move on to those areas in which we are more critical. 
On several occasions in Volume 1 we felt that views contrary to the campaign were 
brushed aside too readily. So for example, Clough begins – rightly – by exploring 
creation and God’s purposes in creation. But it is puzzling that Clough does not treat 
Gen 1:28 there, since one obvious (if wrong) answer would be that the God-given 
human vocation to exercise dominion and subdue provides an account of why both 
human and non-human creatures were created. Likewise Genesis 2 seems clear 
that God created animals as companions for humans, but this is not explored at all 
until the chapter on companion animals in Volume 2. 
A second area with which we disagree is that of Clough’s insistence on the 
possibility of nonhuman animal sin. This has been criticised by Bethany Sollereder, 
who notes that Clough only references chimpanzee behaviour, which cannot be 
translated to other creatures that have lower levels of cognitive ability and are 
evolutionarily further away from Homo sapiens. She goes on to argue that: 
While there may indeed be proto-moral violence amongst the highest of 
sentient non-human animals, it would be impossible to attribute any sort of 
moral rebellion amongst the creatures extant when predation first occurred, 
estimated to be in the early Cambrian period.6  
Similarly, the biblical examples Clough draws upon are all focused on nonhuman 
animals with relatively high levels of cognitive ability, such as oxen; ‘There is no such 
provision in the law codes for locusts, for example’.7 Sollereder prefers to locate the 
need for nonhuman animal reconciliation to God not in their sinning, but in their 
 
6 Bethany N Sollereder, God, Evolution, and Animal Suffering: Theodicy Without a 
Fall. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), p. 68. 
7 Sollereder, God, Evolution, and Animal Suffering, p. 69. 
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existing outside the definition of sin, instead arguing that not sinning is not itself 
perfection in the way that Jesus was perfect in his sinlessness. 
It is a big stretch from viciousness in chimpanzees to supposing that the violence of 
which the non-human world is full everywhere reflects animal sinfulness. And we 
sense problems with method too in this area. Clough is very happy to deploy the 
latest scientific findings in ruling out classic loci of human distinctiveness that have 
been important in the tradition’s reading of its scriptures. But faced with accounts of 
the suffering of animals in nature that derive from contemporary evolutionary theory, 
he claims that: 
Genesis 3 makes clear that something happened which means that we can 
no longer read off God’s purposes by observation of the world in its current 
state. To insist against this that the life of the world we see around us is a 
reliable indication of God’s creative purposes is to privilege our own 
independent observation of the world over basic affirmations concerning the 
doctrine of God that are biblically rooted and defended throughout the 
Christian tradition. (Vol 1, 124) 
So in the one area, human distinctiveness, we can apparently appeal to science to 
overthrow tradition but not in the other, the historical fall. Some meta-reflection on 
this would have strengthened Clough’s account, just as it would have been good to 
acknowledge that most of the Hebrew Bible does not seem to know this 
chronological fall from creaturely harmony. At crucial points Clough reveals the over-
dependence on the sort of fairly literal reading of Genesis 1-11 that has arguably 
distorted much of the encounter between science and Christian theology. In 
particular, the dependence on the Eden myth for God’s original ordering of human 
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relationships with other animals needs to be tempered by a recognition that it is 
unlikely that such a harmonious state ever existed. Clough quotes Barth (very much 
his theological mentor) that ‘the biblical witness looks beyond the field of natural 
history’ (Vol 2, 82); we suggest, rather, that interpretation of scriptural texts needs to 
look at God’s ways with the world in dialogue with what the sciences can tell us. 
Clough does not offer an account of the origins of violence in nature, which so long 
preceded the evolution of human beings. Instead we are back to Barthian territory 
and a sense that ‘We should avoid an account of the fall that is detached from the 
work of Christ’ (Vol 1, 125). But, again, there is no account of God’s reconciliation 
with the (sinning) non-human creature, only a sense that in the final redeemed state 
it will after all make sense for lions to have green plants for food, as Clough claims, 
surely implausibly, that they had in Eden (Vol 1, 121). 
Indeed, our overall concern with the theological volume is that Clough may have 
hitched his star-seeking to too conservative a hermeneutical and theological waggon 
for the project to deliver its full potential. 
The next area of contention which we identify is in Clough’s argument for a functional 
and relational interpretation of the imago Dei.8 This interpretation of the imago Dei, 
plus his understanding of the ambit of incarnation, allows Clough to include other 
animals in the imago. That is not to say that other animals image God in the way 
humans do (though Clough’s account is thin on how that imaging does take place in 
non-human creatures). Humans have been given a great responsibility, which is their 
version of the imago Dei, to live their lives in a certain way; in being given this 
 
8 A detailed typology of interpretations of the imago Dei can be found in: Noreen 
Herzfeld, ‘Creating in Our Own Image: Artificial Intelligence and the Image of God’, 
Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 37.2 (2014): pp. 303-16, esp. p. 304. 
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responsibility, they have also been given power. But, he argues, this power is not an 
inherent part of being human, and nor was this responsibility given to humanity 
because of any inherent power which they already possessed; rather, human power 
is as a result of the divine bestowal (or gifting) of responsibility upon them. Again, 
any theological discontinuity between humans and nonhuman creation is to be found 
in that which has been divinely bestowed upon (or gifted to) them, not in any inherent 
aspect or characteristic of humanity. 
Clough is particularly suspicious of attempts to locate the imago Dei in a supposedly 
unique characteristic of humanity (the substantive interpretation), as whichever 
characteristic is said to be the locus of the imago Dei is often chosen not because of 
any sophisticated theological reasoning but because it is a characteristic which 
humans value about themselves. While Clough accepts there are differences 
between humans and nonhuman animals, he rejects (drawing on Derrida) any 
attempt to list attributes which are supposedly possessed uniquely by humans (Vol 
1, 72-73). 
However, if we dismiss all those characteristics which are commonly attributed to 
humans (Homo sapiens) alone, we risk disintegrating the very remarkable extent to 
which humans are distinctive. We would argue that this distinctiveness is not in a 
single characteristic uniquely possessed by humans, but rather is in a combination of 
characteristics that they uniquely possess. Neither intelligence, nor language, nor 
play, nor tool-use, nor modification of environments is unique to humans, and Clough 
emphasises the new data that reveal this, but humans possess the combination of 
these in a degree that renders them completely distinctive. It is not the case either 
that humans (Homo sapiens) have some characteristic which makes them 
biologically superior to all other organisms, or one which makes them theologically 
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superior to all other organisms. Yet this does not mean that humans (Homo sapiens) 
are not distinctive, and that these properties form the basis of humans’ God-given 
vocation to relationship and creation care. This perception allows us to reclaim the 
very clear assignment of the imago to human beings that we find in Gen 1:26, 28. 
Lastly, we offer some thoughts as to the ethical conclusions reached in Volume 2. 
We are inclined to agree that in each of these areas – the use of other animals for 
food, clothing, tasks, experiments, sport, and companionship, and the relationship 
between humans and wild animals – Clough correctly highlights major abuses and 
indicates directions of travel along which lie improved relations with nonhuman 
animals. This would indeed better reflect their proper theological position within the 
created order as put forth in Volume 1. However, the radical nature of Clough’s 
analysis is bound to raise questions. No use of other animals for food, clothing, or 
experimentation is a bold position indeed. 
Clough claims in his final section that many Christians will find his ethical 
conclusions so inconvenient and uncomfortable that they will challenge the analysis 
that underpins them. Well, we do find ourselves challenging the analysis, but not just 
on grounds of personal discomfort (though we readily admit to that). Clough’s 
conclusion that other animals are loved by God, who cares for them and delights in 
their flourishing, seems irreproachable. And he is right that this rules out 
anthropomonism. But it is much less clear that it rules out a ‘chastened and humble 
anthropocentrism’9 that recognises that – in this interim before the eschaton – 
human needs and interests may indeed come before those of other animals. That 
 
9 Cherryl Hunt, David G. Horrell and Christopher Southgate, ‘An Environmental 
Mantra? Ecological Interest in Rom. 8.19-23 and a Modest proposal for its Narrative 
Interpretation’, J. Theological Studies 59.2 (2008), pp. 546-79, esp. pp. 574-5. 
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indeed is where the great weight of Scripture and tradition lies. Furthermore it is 
striking, and never addressed by Clough, that Jesus’ own practice gives no hint of 
the radical stance Clough advocates. Jesus is in other ways so radical, and is surely 
our best guide to a Kingdom-seeking ethic, yet there is no hint that he had any 
qualms about animals kept for food, or the catching of fish, or indeed animals put to 
tasks. 
Clough must be right that Christians have slipped into colluding with many evil 
practices in food production and other uses of animals. From that point of view 
Volume 2 is extremely timely and should be required reading for any introduction to 
Christian ethics. Much reform is needed, and Christians as consumers can and 
should make their objections to cruelty and exploitation heard at the checkout as well 
as on petitions. But to do that they need not, in our judgment, buy the sweeping 
rejection of animal use that Clough mandates. 
We now consider whether Christians may constructively and with integrity go part-
way down some of Clough’s directions of travel. In his chapter on the use of 
nonhuman animals for food, Clough acknowledges that Christians can lobby the 
farming industry to adopt more ethical practices. This lobbying would take the form of 
buying products from nonhuman animals which have been produced using more 
ethical farming practices, such as buying free-range over battery farmed eggs. 
Indeed, if battery farmed eggs were no longer selling but free-range eggs were, 
certainly there would be an economic incentive on the part of the farmers to stop 
battery-farming and instead use exclusively free-range farming. Yet this is only an 
economic incentive for the farmers to change their practices, and not for the 
consumers to change their buying habits. 
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As it stands in the UK, free-range eggs (to continue using this example, though we 
could just as easily apply this to other nonhuman animal products such as meat, or 
indeed to organic fruits and vegetables for a vegan option) are more expensive than 
battery farmed eggs. This means that, on the part of the consumer, there is an 
economic incentive to buy battery farmed eggs over free-range eggs. One could say 
that education is key – that if people were more informed about the process of 
battery farming, then they would automatically begin spending more money on free-
range eggs because they understand the impact of where they are spending their 
money. Indeed, Catholic theologian Christopher Steck notes that the continuance of 
the morally reprehensible practices of factory farming in the meat industry are partly 
down to public ignorance and, indeed, public wilful ignorance.10 He says further: ‘The 
suffering inflicted upon animals and the quest for cheap meat are, in the operations 
of factory farms, bound together, so that in choosing one, we are effectively choosing 
the other.’11 
The ability to choose where to spend one’s money is, however, a luxury, particularly 
in the UK where more and more people every year are relying on food banks to keep 
themselves and their families fed. According to the Trussell Trust’s most recent end-
of-year statistics, ‘Between 1 April 2018 and 31 March 2019, the Trussell Trust’s 
food bank network distributed 1.6 million three-day emergency food supplies to 
people in crisis, a 19% increase on the previous year.’12 Not only do many people in 
 
10 Christopher Steck, All God’s Animals: A Catholic Theological Framework for 
Animal Ethics (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2019), pp. 210-
11n74. 
11 Steck, All God’s Animals, p. 195. 
12 Trussell Trust. ‘End of year stats.’ Trussell Trust. Accessed 08 July 2020. 
Available at: https://www.trusselltrust.org/news-and-blog/latest-stats/end-year-stats/. 
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the UK not have the incentive to make more ethical choices when shopping, but 
many people do not have the financial ability to make those choices either. 
We conducted a study on the prices of eggs in the UK as of July 2020. We 
investigated the price of large eggs in the top five supermarkets in the UK (as 
revealed by a YouGov study)13, comparing the most expensive non-free-range large 
eggs with the cheapest free-range large eggs. We conducted these investigations on 
the UK websites for each of these supermarkets.14 



















Aldi 14.08p 9.9p 4.8p 
2 M&S Food - -  
 
13 YouGov. ‘The most popular supermarket chains in the UK.’ YouGov. Accessed 08 
July 2020. Available at: https://yougov.co.uk/ratings/food/popularity/supermarket-
chains/all. 
14 These websites were: aldi.co.uk, marksandspencer.com, lidl.co.uk, 
sainsburys.co.uk, and tesco.com. All websites were accessed 08 July 2020. Some 
qualifications to the data are necessary: 1) M&S Food did not display individual 
prices of groceries on their website, instead only showing the prices of meal packs 
and essentials boxes available for delivery and collection in light of the Covid-19 
pandemic; 2) neither Sainsbury’s nor Tesco displayed prices for non-free-range large 
eggs on their websites, indicating that they do not sell large eggs which are not free-




3 Lidl 12.9p 9.9p 3p 
4 Sainsbury’s 18p -  
5 Tesco 20p -  
 
The range of difference in price between individual large free-range eggs and 
individual large battery-farmed eggs was between 3p-4.8p, an amount which could 
easily add up over time. If one chooses instead to shop at a supermarket which does 
not sell battery-farmed eggs, however, individual eggs are up to 17p more expensive 
each than battery-farmed eggs at a supermarket which does. This is one small 
indication of the extent of the systemic change that would need to occur before the 
human relationship with nonhuman animals can truly be improved to any real 
significant degree, which we feel cannot sufficiently be achieved only by the 
behavioural alterations which Clough suggests. This remains, however, only a small 
illustration of how a major shift is needed in the systems by which humans buy and 
consume food. 
Our other major query concerns the analysis of the use of non-human animals for 
medical research. We wonder if Clough would have been quite so sure about his 
conclusion that this is to be absolutely proscribed if he had been writing during the 
COVID pandemic. He is happy to accept all that has been learned in the past 
through the use of animals, but now wants to call an absolute halt. That is perhaps 
not to recognise the huge challenges that human health now faces, and will shortly 
face. Clough, like Linzey, lays great stress on Rom 8:19-22, the liberation of the 
nonhuman creation awaiting the freedom of the glory of the children of God. That 
has clear ethical overtones in terms of what might constitute signs of our freedom. 
But we have already noted that economic constraints may limit human possibilities. 
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How much greater is the threat to human freedom and flourishing posed by major 
diseases? Clough is right to realise that animal experimentation has many problems, 
and needs to be subject to tighter and tighter controls, but wrong to suppose that it 
does not remain a vital tool in seeking to protect human flourishing, which is under 
graver threat than most imagined until this spring. We are not nearly as conversant 
as Clough with the literature in this area, but we suspect this conclusion too needed 
more robust engagement with its critics. 
In this article, we have provided an overview and critical evaluation of both volumes 
of David Clough’s work On Animals. We first described the key points and 
arguments given across both books. We then provided our own views on these, 
agreeing with many though not all of Clough’s theological conclusions from Volume 
1, but ultimately concluding that Clough’s ethical solutions in Volume 2 are too 
radical in places, and too optimistic without economic and systemic changes as to 
how humans relate to the nonhuman world. 
